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Abstract
More than a year after the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) deadline, 
experts and social commentators are divided on the outcome of the goals on 
poverty reduction. The UN Secretariat and its agencies, while acknowledging 
that the business of ending poverty is ‘unfinished,’ described the goals as 
globally successful notably for mobilising the world toward a global agenda; a 
claim sharply dismissed by many economists. Critics point to the persistent high 
levels of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and argue that the fall in global 
poverty is largely due to the significant reduction of poverty in China, India 
and East Asia. The MDGs’ mixed success has been attributed to conceptual, 
methodological and implementation incoherence. These challenges, some of 
which are inherent in the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), partly 
account for the high rate of poverty in SSA notwithstanding the MDGs’ efforts. 
Meeting the SDGs target of ending poverty in SSA by 2030 will require a deeper 
understanding of the methodological and practical challenges that characterised 
the MDGs. 
Keywords: Poverty eradication; Africa; Inequality; Millennium Development 
Goals; Sustainable Development Goals.
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1. Introduction
Africa joined the rest of the world more than a year ago to work towards 
poverty eradication by 2030 per the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
But the outcome of the SDGs’ predecessor, the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), has been characterized by mixed reactions. The main actors such as 
the UN Secretariat, its agencies and the World Bank while acknowledging the 
'unfinished business', have described the MDGs as largely successful, notably for 
mobilizing the world toward a global agenda.1 The UN’s MDGs’ report shows 
a significant reduction in global poverty since 1990 largely attributable to the 
successes in China and India but noting well the high concentration of poverty in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Between 1990 and 2012, poverty in Africa reduced 
from fifty-six per cent to forty-three per cent respectively (Beegle, Christiaensen, 
Dabalen, and Gaddis, 2016). This fall in poverty has been offset by the effect 
of population growth, resulting in an increase in the absolute number of poor 
people by hundred million (Beegle et al., 2016). This implies poverty reduction 
has not kept pace with population growth in the continent. The rise in absolute 
poverty has led many to doubt the success verdict passed on the MDGs. Hickel 
(2016), for instance, has questioned the “good news narrative” of the MDGs. 
Hickel points out that with the exception of China and East Asia; there has been 
little or no reduction in the number of poor people in the developing world. On 
aggregate, he believes poverty could be increasing in absolute terms in Africa.  In 
fact, it is consistent with the UN’s acknowledgement of the unfinished business 
that world leaders met in September 2015 to ratify the SDGs as the new global 
development goals. 
The inability of the MDGs to deliver significant poverty reduction in 
SSA Africa is largely the result of the challenges that bedeviled the goals – 
conceptual, methodological and implementation challenges. However, existing 
studies have focused on  the global perspective, ignoring the mixed trends across 
countries. For instance, Easterly (2007), Fukuda-Parr (2010) and Hickle (2016) 
all address the framing of the MDGs either to the disadvantage of Africa as 
Easterly suggests or the approach to measuring the goals as Fukuda-Parr argued. 
These papers have not assessed the outcome of the goals with reference to any 
specific region such as sub-Saharan Africa – something this paper will consider. 
1 See for instance the 2015 MDG Report from the UN and the World Bank’s 2015/2016 Global Monitoring 
Report. The President of the World Bank and the Director of IMF in their foreword to the 2015/2016 
Global Monitoring Report called on the world to celebrate the success of the MDGs.
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Evaluating the achievement of the MDGs in sub-Saharan Africa is crucial to 
avoiding any potentially misleading conclusion drawn from the global account 
of poverty reduction. For instance, large poverty reduction from China has the 
potential to create the impression of a significant fall in poverty but this may not 
be representative of the global perspective. This paper, therefore, focuses on 
three main issues: one, evaluating the criticisms against the defunct MDGs and 
how those challenges affected the achievement of the goals. Two, analyzing 
the post-MDGs poverty levels in Africa. And three, drawing lessons from the 
MDGs’ flaws towards ending poverty in SSA by 2030 as per the SDGs. To do 
this, I review the trend of poverty globally and in sub-Saharan Africa, relying 
on data from the World Bank’s 2016 Global Monitoring Report, the Economic 
Commission for Africa MDG progress report and country statistics on the 
MDGs. This study contributes to a dearth of relevant empirical studies in sub-
Saharan Africa even as the region is becoming increasingly important on the 
world stage (Tunyi & Ntim, 2016). . 
From the outset the MDGs framework was murky, causing disagreements 
among economists. The MDGs faced numerous challenges including the 
ambiguity of the approach to measuring the goals and the lack of clarity on 
whether the goals were to be measured at the global or national levels.  Even the 
SDGs that have gone through wide consultation have met their own criticism 
only a year after their launch. My focus then is to analyze these challenges, 
and relying on the extent of poverty reduction in Africa, outline the resulting 
implications for eradicating poverty in SSA by 2030. The rest of the paper is 
divided into four sections. The next section explains the challenges that faced 
the MDGs and the current SDGs. The third section focuses on the post-MDGs’ 
poverty levels in sub-Saharan Africa. Section four contains the lessons drawn 
from the MDG narrative.
2. The conceptual and measurement challenges
2.1. The MDGs 
Conceptual challenges relate to those of how the MDGs were drawn up. They 
relate to the ideas on which the goals are built Methodological/measurement 
issues relate to the approach used in assessing progress. However, both 
conceptual and measurement challenges overlap.  A conceptual issue of whether 
the goals be drafted as national or global can translate into whether they are 
measured by global or national metrics.
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First of all, there was confusion as to whether the MDGs were to be 
considered planned targets or benchmarks for measuring poverty reduction 
progress. Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein (2010) have argued that the goals be 
seen as benchmarks for assessing the speed of progress in poverty abatement 
rather than as targets to be met. If the former approach was adopted, then it 
becomes inevitable to measure the success or failure by the extent to which the 
targets have been met. The latter approach considers the MDGs as signposts, 
the purpose of which, Jan Vandemoortele, one of the architects of the MDGs 
insists was “meant to encourage the countries to strive for accelerated progress” 
(Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein 2010:2).  Nevertheless, the authors note carefully 
the inconsistency between Vandemoortele’s observation and the UN’s own 
system, with its documents and economists that treated the goals as hard targets 
to be met.
 But why does it matter whether the goals were considered planned targets 
or benchmarks for measuring global poverty? If the goals are treated as targets, 
the potential to concentrate on a narrow view of poverty (the consumption per 
day) is likely. In this instant, we are likely to sweep aside the poor’s ‘capacity 
to function’ which is not only related to daily consumption. If we consider the 
goals as signposts for assessing the fall of poverty, controversies emerge as 
to who is moving faster in poverty reduction than who. Or better still, if the 
goals are merely ‘inspirational’ then how do we know how good the progress 
in fighting global poverty is? But at least, this approach appeals more than the 
former method of attempting to summarize the result of the MDGs as either 
‘met’ or ‘not met.’ 
Secondly, should the MDGs be judged at the global level or country-specific 
results? The MDGs were set out as global goals but succeeded in getting lost 
in translation2 as national goals (Saith, 2006; Vandemoortele, 2012 and Gore, 
2015). Addressing the issue of the wrong translation of the MDGs as national 
goals, Gore (2015a) acknowledged first of all that the MDGs were in fact global 
goals. The problem Gore sought to identify was what kind of global goals they 
were and how they were later integrated into national agendas. He argues that 
in bowing to the pressure from the international community to situate the goal 
of poverty eradication in their national agendas, Least Developed Countries 
undertook policies that deviated from the policies that have historically produced 
2 Saith (2006) observes that conceptual incoherence is evident in the transition from “human values, to 
dimensions of human development and then to targets and indicators” for misinterpretation of the MDGs 
as national goals, see Vandermootele (2012).
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significant and sustained poverty reduction in the developed countries  This has 
been true in the case of SSA countries. For instance, most SSA countries relied 
on GDP growth as an antidote in itself to cut down poverty which Obeng-Odoom 
(2013) rightly critiqued leading economists for relying on such traditional 
measures of development to construct a positive view of African development. 
No attention was paid to the inequalities that threatened the fight against poverty 
in the midst of the growing economies (Akolgo, 2017).  
If the MDGs are considered as global goals as the UN’s 2015 MDGs’ report 
would have us believe, their success or failure will be judged by the global 
extent of poverty reduction. So that if China eradicated poverty completely or 
as the UN’s report has shown the large reductions in poverty from China and 
India, the goal of halving poverty between 1990 and 2015 would be proclaimed 
fruitful even if poverty deepened in Africa. But this measure that was adopted 
raises a question of the universality of those goals if their progress is not felt 
across regions or countries. 
But how global should ‘global goals’ be and why does it matter whether the 
goals are properly communicated as global or national goals? In the first case, 
should there not be a more inclusive measure of the ‘global’ attainment of the 
goal than treating the world as though it was borderless and poor people had 
no location? If we lump poor countries as the MDGs were broadly described 
as successful, we ignore the fact that poor people in Africa do not easily move 
to China to take advantage of its economic successes. In short, we ignore 
differences across the globe and celebrate ‘a development success’ even if 
others were dying elsewhere. In the second instance, if they are global goals, 
how do they gain national significance and attention from the various countries? 
Like Gore (2015, p.1) put in his presentation, ‘our judgement of social justice 
is rooted in national frames of reference’. Global goals must therefore reflect 
national aspirations, development needs and national thinking. If global goals 
are far removed from what developing countries such as those of Africa, should 
be doing to eradicate poverty, then the goals risk two potential problems. One, 
they will either not be accepted by various countries in practice, through their 
national development policies. Or two, they goals will reflect different aims as 
opposed to those of the participating countries. 
The third point has to do with the “play with numbers.” The imputation 
of success by the UN has hinged on the rate of change in poverty, with little 
regard for the absolute numbers of poverty.  While in most cases, the rate of 
poverty has reduced as in sub-Saharan Africa, the numbers of poor people have 
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increased. This has been mostly the result of population growth. But after 15 
years we may have to answer the question Obeng-Odoom (2013) posed: “Is 
life in Africa getting better?” (p. 151). Whether the reliance is on rates or raw 
numbers, it is the improvement in peoples’ lives that ultimately becomes the 
center of discourse and the basis on which policy makers commit resources 
(Alagidede, 2012).
A fourth point that must be noted is inconsistencies relating to the scope of 
the  poverty goal that the MDGs sought to achieve and the starting point for 
measuring the progress. The MDGs’ perceived success by the UN in the face of 
large numbers of poor people has been linked to its history of “shifting goalposts” 
(Pogge cited by Hickel, 2016:2). In 1996, the Rome World Food Summit pledged 
to tackle hunger by halving the number of undernourished people. But after a 
while, there was a shift from absolute figures to proportions. By the year 2000, 
the decision shifted after the Millennium Declaration to halving the proportion 
of the world living below the poverty threshold of $1 per day.3 The sudden 
change in approach (from absolute figures to proportions), four years after the 
Rome Declaration, Hickel (2016) insists, made the achievement of MDG1 
easier than the commitment of the Rome Declaration. This paper notes that 
besides the inconsistencies spanning from global/national nature of the MDGs 
to measurement of progress as against meeting targets, the focus of the MDG 
report on the rate of change in poverty while neglecting the absolute numbers 
amounts to an attempt to arrive at a positive outcome in the face of large poor 
populations. This is particularly worrying in the case of many countries in SSA.
A part of the goalposts shifting has been the question of the starting date of the 
MDGs. While the Millennium Declaration from which the MDGs were born was 
agreed in the year 2000, the starting date of the goals was shifted back to 1990. 
This was done to probably take advantage of the gains in poverty reduction, 
particularly significant were the gains from China (Hickel, 2016).  By measuring 
the poverty reduction goal retrospectively, the extent of poverty reduction 
from the MDGs’ efforts was exaggerated than the goals actually achieved. The 
progress of any country towards ending poverty as Rippin (2013) observes, is 
explained by its initial position, which is the starting point for measuring the 
goal. The shift back to 1990 from 2000 disadvantaged SSA countries compared 
to other developing countries. The SDGs however have avoided this trap by 
being designed to take effect from the time they were agreed, which was in 
September, 2015.    
3 See Hickle (2016) and Pogge (2004, 2009 and 2010) for a chronology of this goalposts shifting. 
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2.2. The SDGs 
The conceptual/methodological incoherence is not only related to the defunct 
MDGs but the SDGs, though the latter agenda built on the weaknesses of the 
MDGs. Firstly, the SDGs risk being too many and overly ambitious. The MDGs 
were relatively easy to understand and manageable in number given the eight 
goals but the same cannot be said of the 17 SDGs. Less than a week after the 
goals were launched in September 2015, Easterly (2015) described most of 
the SDGs as “unactionable” “unquantifiable” and some, “unattainable.” For 
Easterly, a goal such as “end poverty in all its forms and dimensions” is utopian 
and wishful. While this claim may carry some weight, the deeper threat behind 
such exaggerated goal is not the inability to achieve it, for if it were given the 
necessary commitment and sacrifice of the world leaders, it could be realized 
in less time. Worse than its utopian nature is the attempt to provide room for 
the goalposts shifting to arrive at what is expected to be declared in 2030 – a 
successful global effort at ending poverty, regardless the reality. Not only does 
goal 1 appear overly ambitious, it is contradicted by one of its targets (1.2) which 
aims to “reduce by half men, women and children of all ages living in poverty 
in all its dimensions according to national definitions” (Loewe & Rippin, 2015).
Secondly, the SDGs continue the “pointillist” approach to development goal-
setting as Kohler (2015) has rightly called it. This avoids the rigor of putting 
forward the complex relationships between and among the goals. The goal 
to end poverty in all its forms can be impeded if the relationship between it 
and those of the other 16 goals are not deeply understood by implementing 
agencies or countries. For instance, poverty eradication is inseparable from 
such issues as controlling inequality, ending hunger and promoting peace. The 
goals fall short of establishing the linkages between these goals and this could 
pose a challenge to effectively delivering their promises. A third challenge 
faced by the SDGs is the failure to clearly allocate responsibility for executing 
certain targets. The roles countries and the extent to which they are expected 
to contribute to the global agenda is not spelt out lucidly. Pogge & Sengupta 
(2015) commenting on the allocation of responsibility are of the view that the 
silence of the goals/targets to “formulate” and “specify” responsibilities creates 
room for main actors to deny their roles in meeting the targets. As they put it, 
there is an “inequitable allocation of burdens and blame (which) is precisely 
what happened to the MDGs” (p. 574). To avoid “shifting of blame” in sub-
Saharan African countries, there must be obvious definition of whom or which 
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institution is responsible for which poverty eradication initiative and to what 
extent they are expected to go.
Thirdly, there is an absence of express commitment of developed countries’ 
contribution in funding the new global agenda, especially for less resourced 
developing countries. The fact also that neoliberal ideologies such Africa’s 
trade with the West are threatened by the exit of Britain from the European 
Union (BREXIT) which may present new funding challenges for most  African 
countries towards poverty eradication by 2030. Once the SDGs ratification 
failed to extract clear financial commitment from these powerful and resourced 
states, the door is opened for whoever is in the office to use discretion to either 
support the effort to end global poverty or not, after all the global accord is not 
binding. A fourth challenge that the SDGs face is the time frame within which 
goals, particularly poverty eradication is expected to be met. The MDGs were 
criticized for being short to medium term goals and not taking into account 
sustainability, an issue the SDGs have not addressed by relying on the 15-year 
time frame (Loewe, 2012). As already observed 15 years does not appear a 
realistic time period to “end poverty in all its form.”
In an editorial earlier before the adoption of the SDGs, Gore (2015b) observed 
that the SDGs were flawed in some dimensions. Gore identifies four main 
problems with the SDGs from the papers in the special issue.4  (i) The SDGs 
are deficient in providing a coherent, underlying policy framework. (ii) Little 
attention is paid to articulating the goals within national priorities and processes. 
(iii) SDGs fail to focus on synergies and trade-offs between different goals. 
(iv) There is the failure to set new global rules such as those governing global 
governance and finance to match the new goals. Additionally, the success of 
the SDGs will require a deep understanding of Institutional Political Economy 
to our ability to build resilient and inclusive cities (Obeng-Odoom, 2016). For 
Obeng-Odoom, mainstream economics approaches have misunderstood the 
place of cities in development, a situation which is not supportive of the post-
2015 urban context. Rather, he proposes Institutionalism, which “regards the 
urban as part of, not apart from, wider socio-economic and political processes.” 
The SDGs in their current state do not sufficiently address the above issues 
that were raised earlier before the September 2015 summit. Ending poverty 
in 2030 will only be achieved to the extent that the goals are integrated into 
4 Journal of International Development 2015  Special Issue on the Post 2015 Moment. Specific papers on 
the special issue give details on the SDGs’ weaknesses.  For example those by Koehler  (2015); Meagher, 
(2015);  Kim, Kang, Leach and Moore (2015) .
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country-level agendas. It is still early days and opportunities abound to rethink 
these goals in relation to national development plans particularly those of SSA.
3. Poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa
3.1. Post MDGs 
The MDGs have been hailed for their unparalleled success of having mobilized 
the world toward a common agenda (Fukuda-Parr & Greenstein 2010; Rippin 
2013; and Higgins 2013). If the statistics generated by institutions like the UN, 
World Bank and IMF are anything to go by, then Africa is better today in terms 
of the rate of poverty in the continent. But that is not the case: the fall in the 
rate of poverty does not tell the entire story, plus the global picture hides at the 
background, the true state of poverty in the various countries.
table 1: global Poverty assessed wIth the re-estImated Poverty lIne
Region Historical headline projection
1990 1999 2011 2012 2015
Share of population below $1.90 a day (2011 PPP %)
East Asia and Pacific 60.6 37.5 8.5 7.2 14.1
Europe and Central Asia 1.9 7.8 2.4 2.1 1.7
Latin American/Caribbean 17.8 13.9 5.9 5.6 5.6
Middle East/N. Africa - - - - -
South Asia 50.6 41.8 22.2 18.8 13.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 56.8 58.0 44.4 42.7 35.2
Developing World 44.4 34.3 16.5 14.9 11.9
World 37.1 29.1 14.1 12.7 9.6
Millions of people below $1.90 a day (2011 PPP)
East Asia and Pacific               995.5           689.4             173.1           147.2              82.6      
Europe and Central Asia             8.8              36.8              11.4             10.1                4.4
Latin American/Caribbean        78.2              71.1             35.3              33.7              29.7
Middle East/N. Africa                     -      -                   -                    -                   -
South Asia                               574.6           568.0            361.7            309.2            231.3
Sub-Saharan Africa                 287.6            374.6           393.6            388.8            347.1
World                                     1958.6         1751.5            983.3            896.7            702.1
Source: World Bank, Global Monitoring Report (2016)
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fIgure 1: maJorIty of the toP ten Poor countrIes are In sub-saharan afrIca
Source: World Bank, Global Monitoring Report (2016)
One striking feature of the UN’s MDG report and the World Bank’s estimates 
is that more people still live in extreme poverty in Africa than any other 
continent. For instance, 41 per cent of the region’s population is projected to 
still live in extreme poverty by the end of 2015 (UN, 2015). The World Bank’s 
global poverty estimates based on 2011 PPP prices does not equally look good 
for sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly 400 million people (about 42.7 per cent of SSA’s 
population) are estimated to have lived in extreme poverty by the end of 2012 
(Table 1). About 347.1 million people in sub-Saharan Africa are projected to 
be living in extreme poverty by the close of 2015 compared to 287.6 million 
in 1990, though the share of the population in poverty reduced within the same 
time. The result of the rise in population with the poverty reduction effort is 
that the number of poor people has consistently increased since the 1980s and 
has only fallen slightly between 2011 and 2015 (Table 1). SSA also appears to 
have witnessed a slower fall in poverty in comparison to the entire developing 
world. For instance, while poverty in the developing world fell by 32.5 per cent 
between 1990 and 2015 that of SSA fell by 21.6 per cent within the same period.
Africa’s share of global poverty has seen a persistent increase from less 
than 20 percent in 1990 to nearly 50 percent in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). In 
contrast, East Asia, which accounted for over 50 per cent of the share of global 
poverty in 1990, is now responsible for less than 20 per cent. This clearly, is 
evidence that poverty is still a largely unsolved development problem in SSA. 
The poverty rates among the top 10 ten countries with the largest number of 
poor people who account for almost 70 per cent of global poverty (Cruz, et 
al. 2015), are further testimony of how deep and concentrated poverty is in 
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the continent. For instance, six countries (Madagascar, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Ethiopia) out of the list are in sub-
Saharan Africa, and these are the deeply poor among the list (Figure 1).
3.2. Country-level statistics shows uneven successes across SSA 
Using the Africa-wide outlook on poverty does not tell the entire story.  Country-
level statistics show that while sub-Saharan Africa in general may not have 
met the 2015 target of halving the poor population between 1990 and 2015, 
some economies have achieved many of the targets in MDG1, yet others lagged 
behind (Economic Commission for Africa, 2014). South Africa, for instance, 
attained most of targets way before the deadline (Table 2).  In Cameroon, while 
the government confessed that it was unlikely to meet the MDG1 target, civil 
society argued it was off track with the MDG poverty goal. 
fIgure 2: ghana, natIonal Poverty rates, 1992-2013 (usIng new Poverty lIne)
Source: Cooke, Hague and McKay (2016)
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table 2: south afrIca's Progress towards meetIng mdg1
Goal 1 Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger
Target 1A: Halve between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people whose income is less 
than one dollar a day
Indicators 1994
Baseline
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Source: South Africa Millennium Development Goals country report, 2013
Countries such as Mozambique, Burundi, Madagascar and the Central 
African Republic remain in extreme poverty. It appears not much has changed 
since the turn of this century and sometimes poverty has worsened (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2014). For instance Nigeria’s new government led by 
President Buhari is revealing government corruption that eroded the country’s 
gains from its growth. Ghana halved its poor population by 2013 (Figure 2). As 
Figure 2 shows, the incidence of poverty has fallen consistently in Ghana. In 
Cameroon both the government and civil society admitted that it was unlikely 
to meet the MDG1 target (Commonwealth Foundation, 2013).  
All this uneven country evidence go to support the argument that the MDGs 
were better off measured at the country level than at the global stage given 
the tendency for failure of some economies to be clouded by unprecedented 
successes in other economies. Such an approach for the SDGs can provide an 
intuitive basis for assessments. As Aryeetey et al. (2012, p. 18) have rightly 
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stated, ‘Global goals become de facto national goals since getting to zero poverty 
worldwide implies getting to (or near) zero in every country’.
4. Agenda 2030: implications for poverty eradication
The world today faces a new set of goals aimed at realizing the dream of a ‘world 
free of poverty.’ The SDGs are geared toward eradicating extreme poverty by 
2030 and promoting shared prosperity. These two commitments have been 
developed into 17 goals which are guiding the international community for the 
next 15 years. How effective the global community and more importantly the 
various African countries execute the planned projects toward meeting these 
goals will largely determine how many of the extremely poor can truly lift 
themselves out of their misery. For SSA countries to end extreme poverty by 
2030, a few points should be noted.
One, poverty eradication requires adapting the SDGs to national policies and 
development frameworks taking into account the prevailing conditions and needs 
of the poorest population. This implies an assessment of the sectors, policies and 
initiatives that are broad-based and whose growth and/or implementation can 
deliver significant relief to the predominantly poor communities. Steven (2015) 
reports that participants in a reality check  round table discussion on the SDGs 
acknowledged that the success of the SDGs (in this case the goal on poverty 
eradication) depends on the extent to which the goals are “Integrated into policy 
at national and local levels” (p. 12). The participants were also unanimous on 
the fact that achieving the SDGs will require mobilizing resources at national 
and international levels.
Two, the success of the 2030 agenda on poverty eradication in SSA is 
contingent on a deeper understanding of how economic growth, poverty and 
inequality interplay in the region. Obeng-Odoom (2015a) and Akolgo (2017) 
have demonstrated that the Afro-euphoria is a paradox given that the continent 
has witnessed a simultaneous rise in economic growth (the crux of the ‘Africa 
rising narrative’) and deteriorating living standards. The goals have already 
received praises for placing inequality at the centre of development though they 
remain unclear and abstract (Freistein and Mahlet, 2016). Ensuring that growth 
benefits the vulnerable and breaching the gaps between the rich and poor will be 
critical to eradicating poverty.  The goal of eradicating extreme poverty is within 
reach. But this will require a paradigm shift in the prevailing development system 
in SSA. Positive structural reforms will be needed to propel higher economic 
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growth in the region, reduce the escalating inequalities, and maintain the level 
of poverty reduction achieved so far.
Three, the efficient management of financial aid. It is expected that at least 
some form of aid, as usual, will flow into Africa towards the 2030 agenda. 
Unless this is properly utilized, it may not succeed in eradicating poverty.  From 
the point of foreign organizations that give this aid, it will be counterproductive 
if they continue to tie such aid to conditionalities that do not encourage job 
creation.  The management of aid by African countries must as well be improved. 
Ensuring that aid reach the poor is important. In fact, waiting on aid to end 
poverty in 2030 should be a last option for African governments. If African 
countries are to depend on foreign aid: the large portion of which will likely 
be exhausted before the poor hear of it, then we can expect to have national 
statistics showing how far poverty has fallen in this continent while the living 
conditions of ordinary people grow from bad to worse.
Four, good governance.  Promoting good governance and ending conflicts will 
be crucial to ending poverty in Africa. Acts of war and terrorism inhibit growth 
and development. SSA has witnessed so much turmoil over the last decade. 
Promoting democracy and good governance can play key roles in the fight against 
poverty. Good governance in the present times and for the attainment of the 
SDGs will also require improvement in the statistical capacities of all countries. 
More often than not, the statistics churned out by many African countries are 
scorned as “cooked data.” As long as accurate, timely and reliable data is not 
available, the poverty narrative in the region will remain subject to different 
interpretations even in the face of significant achievements. However, there is 
more to ending poverty than hunting data to prove the rate of poverty eradication. 
More resources must be committed to ending poverty than measuring it.
 The new agenda also demands an understanding of Africa as a significant 
participant in the global fight against poverty in the continent and the rest of the 
world, not as an observer or subject of philanthropy. Obeng-Odoom (2015b) 
rightly put it when he wrote on the approach towards Africa’s post MDGs’ 
future cautioning that Africa should be viewed “from its own vantage point 
and experiences not as unique but as related to the world, in both history and 
place, and the resulting and continuing ramifications not only in material but 
also psychological terms … in the post 2015 development agenda.” (p. 44). 
For instance, African countries should be given the commensurate price for 
resources such as gold, oil and cocoa. Where it is possible, partnering these less 
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developed countries in processing the raw materials can create more jobs and 
alleviate poverty among unemployed citizens.  
5. Conclusion
In short, despite the various interventions in SSA, the region as a whole is 
home to large numbers of poor people as against general significant decline 
of poverty in the developing world. For instance, this paper has showed that 
the fall in poverty in SSA has been slower compared to the entire developing 
world. Country-level review however shows significant improvements in some 
African countries. The literature reveals a consensus that poverty is pervasive 
in the SSA region notwithstanding the MDGs’ efforts. The MDGs discourse 
has witnessed diverse views on the success of the goal of poverty eradication. 
But the disagreements have largely been the result of methodologically gaps 
– measuring rate of change as against absolute changes, the emphasis on the 
global picture as against country realities, and the disadvantage to SSA as a 
result of measuring the MDGs retroactively from 1990 instead of the year 
2000. Once these methodological issues are set aside, it is clear that poverty 
is concentrating in SSA. It is possible to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030 if 
not “end poverty in all its forms and dimensions” as the SDGs suggest. But that 
requires avoiding the challenges that bedeviled the MDGs. If African leaders 
fail to adopt pragmatic strategies towards poverty reduction by 2030, the goal of 
poverty eradication may fade into hopelessness, ushering in even larger numbers 
of poor people in the SSA region.
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Appendix:
Gore (2015) has set out the policy decisions that poor countries need to do 
to reduce poverty in a “multidimensional and substantial way” based on the 
existing experience of developed countries as follows:
1. Promote high GDP with increasing I/GDP, X/GDP and S/GDP
2. Increasing agricultural productivity and adequate food supplies for 
agricultural and non-agricultural population
3. Promote growth of formal employment opportunities outside agriculture at a 
rate faster than total population growth
4. Import/learn/adapt foreign technology
5. Pursue strategic integration with regional and global product and factor 
markets to accelerate capital accumulation, technology acquisition and 
structural transformation
6. Promote early demographic transition and ensure the urbanization rate is not 
too fast and not too spatially concentrated
7. Manage distribution for social cohesion and use social policy for productive 
ends
8. Build a developmental state with popular engagement in a shared national 
development project and close government-business relations.
